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Simulating Human Behaviour: the Invisible
Choreography of Self–Referential Systems
David. Batten@csiro.au
CSIRO Manufacturing and Infrastructure Technology, Melbourne, Australia

Abstract: Challenges arise when it comes to capturing complex patterns of human behaviour in
agent-based simulations. For example, human beings are not limited to one identity, to local levels of
awareness or to acting on predetermined rules. Seemingly immune from these difficulties are some
self-referential problems – situations where agents’ forecasts act to create the world they are trying to
forecast. The emergent complexity in these systems results more from ways in which agents interact
and react rather than from their individual idiosyncrasies. A well-known example is the Bar problem,
whose collective regularities are relatively insensitive to the vagaries of individuals. Some other sociotechnical, socio-economic and socio-ecological systems of a self-referential nature are discussed.
Many self-referential systems are intriguing because there is an air of inevitability about them. They
seem to co-evolve in prearranged ways, as if under the spell of an invisible choreographer.
Keywords: Agent-based models; Bar problem; Self-referential behaviour; Sheep and explorers

1. INTRODUCTION
The pace of development in agent-based
simulation models linking social, economic
and ecological interactions has been rapid.
Many simulation models representing facets of
human behaviour have emerged [Arthur, 1994;
Axelrod, 1997; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999,
Barreteau and Bousquet, 2000].
Social
scientists use simulation for several purposes,
including discovery of collective regularities.
Some have been built on strong behavioural
foundations, where the mental models of the
artificial agents are supported by empirical
data or stakeholders’ views. In others, agents’
strategies have been chosen arbitrarily or
stochastically and the outcomes tested in
computational experiments. Both approaches
have yielded interesting results.
In a recent paper to the IBM Systems Journal,
Kurtz and Snowden [2003] assert that there are
some important contextual differences between
the behaviour of human and ant colonies,
making it difficult to simulate humans using
computer models. Unlike social insects, we
are not genetically hardwired for cooperative
behaviour. They list several challenges when
it comes to capturing complex patterns of
human behaviour in agent-based simulations:
(1) Humans are not limited to one identity or
any common set of emotions;
(2) Humans are not limited to acting in
accordance with predetermined rules;
(3) Humans are not limited to acting on local
patterns.

On first sight, such challenges look daunting.
Clearly it is difficult to consider all scales of
human awareness simultaneously, instead of
choosing one circle of influence when devising
mental models to represent human behaviour
in a specific context. On further reflection,
however, these challenges may not be critical
for simulating certain social collectives. One
class of social systems that seems relatively
immune is self-referential systems – situations
where the forecasts made by agents serve to
create the world they are trying to forecast.
The emergent complexity in these systems
arises more from ways in which the agents
interact and affect each other and less from
each agent’s individual idiosyncrasies.
The purpose of this paper is to look at one selfreferential system (the Bar Problem) and show
that its collective outcomes are insensitive to
the vagaries of individuals. Although it does
not necessarily follow that all self-referential
systems have this property, there is a similar
air of inevitability about many of them. They
appear to co-evolve in prearranged ways, as if
under the spell of an invisible choreographer.

2. THE HUMAN IDENTITY PROBLEM
2.1

K&S Argument Number 1

K&S stress that “In a human complex system,
an agent is anything that has identity, and we
constantly flex our identities both individually
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and collectively.” We play different roles at
the same time – e.g. parent, spouse, employee
or neighbour – and will behave differently
depending on the context. Collectively, we
might belong to a dissenting community group.
When faced with a common threat, however,
we might change this identity and throw our
support behind the same government that
prompted our dissent. Their key point is that it
is often impossible to know in advance which
unit of analysis we are working with. K&S are
critical of several attempts to overcome this
“unit of analysis” problem in the social
simulation literature:
(1) They argue that identity goes deeper than
norms, a concept often used to explain
group behaviour [Axelrod, 1997];
(2) They argue that much internal diversity
and patterning is suppressed if individuals
are modelled as agents;
(3) They argue that use of an idea or “meme”
as the unit of analysis is insufficient to
capture the dynamics of multiple
identities [Dawkins, 1976].
Despite the weight of their arguments, the
identity problem may not always be as serious
as K&S suggest. Who a person is may not be
as vital for exploring the emergent properties
of certain human collectives as representing
the heterogeneous mix of agents’ behavioural
strategies and their interactions in the
appropriate co-evolutionary context. When a
mix of strategies co-evolves over time, any
flexing of individual identities is unlikely to
have much impact on collective outcomes.
One setting where individual identities play a
limited role is the bar problem, an early agentbased simulation of a complex adaptive system
reported by Brian Arthur [1994].
2.2 The Bar Problem Defined
Consider a system of N = 100 agents deciding
independently each week whether or not to go
to their favourite bar next Thursday. Space is
limited, so the evening is enjoyable only if the
bar is not too crowded (say Nmax = 60). There
is no collusion or prior communication among
agents. Knowing the bar attendance over the
past few weeks, each bar-loving agent simply
decides independently to go if he expects less
than Nmax to attend and to stay home if he
expects more than Nmax to go.
This problem is a metaphor for a broad class of
social situations: e.g. urban traffic congestion,
canteen crowding, queue lengths at big events,
fishing strategies and many other commons or
coordination problems. It has some interesting

properties. First, if a decision model existed
that agents could rely upon to forecast
attendance, then a deductive solution would be
possible. No such model exists. Irrespective
of past attendance figures, many plausible
hypotheses could be adopted to predict future
attendance. Because agents’ rationality is
bounded, they are forced to reason inductively.
Second, any shared expectations will be selfdefeating and broken up. If all agents believe
most will go, then nobody will go. By staying
home, that common belief will be destroyed.
If all agents believe few will go, then all will
go, thus undermining that belief. The result is
that agents’ expectations must always differ.
Perplexed by the intractability of this problem,
Arthur created a computer simulation in which
his agents were given attendance figures over
the past few months. Also, he created an
“alphabetic soup” of several dozen predictors
replicated many times. After randomly ladling
out k of these to each agent, each kept track of
his k different predictors and decided whether
to go or not according to a preferred predictor
in his set. This preferred predictor could be
chosen in a variety of ways, although Arthur
adopted the currently most accurate predictor
for each agent in his simulations.
Each predictor is a means of deciding between
two simple alternatives: GO or DON’T GO. It
could be tied to a much richer set of decision
criteria, including an agent’s multiple identities
or moods. When deciding whether to go to our
favourite bar, for example, our simultaneous
roles as a parent, a spouse or employee impact
differently on our decision at different times.
Provided the desire is to go to an uncongested
bar each week, however, a richer soup of
identity-flexing hypotheses is unlikely to alter
the results of Arthur’s simulations (see the next
section) in any qualitative way.

3.

THE INTENTIONALITY PROBLEM

3.1 K&S Argument Number 2
K&S argue how difficult it is to simulate free
will and complex intentionality. Simulations
have addressed cooperation, reputation, gossip,
reciprocity, lying and trust, but are yet to
address other aspects – like duplicity, rumour,
self-deception, manipulation, stress, confusion,
ambiguity and charisma. Although the list is
challenging, not all of it is relevant to the aims
of those engaged in agent-based simulation.
Whether humans do act in accordance with
certain predetermined rules or not is not the
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primary question, but rather can we identify
certain patterns when agents behave as if
governed by predetermined mechanisms (such
as certain cognitive processes). In this respect,
human being and ants are similar. We still do
not know if ants behave according to certain
predetermined mechanisms, but at least we can
model and study them as if this is the case.
A key difference between the strong-AI school
of the seventies (hoping to reproduce human
intelligence) and those doing agent-based
simulation is that the latter are not expecting to
simulate how people will behave in every
instance [Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999]. Their
main aims are: (1) to show how heterogeneous
micro-worlds of individual behaviours interact
to generate macroscopic regularities, and (2) to
show how alternative collective outcomes may
evolve under different conditions. Both are
sensitive to interactions between agents, rather
than to the agents’ individual predilections.
3.2 The Bar Problem Simulated
Once decisions have been made in Arthur’s
simulated bar, agents learn the new attendance
figure, updating the accuracy of their own set
of predictors. Then decisions are made for the
following week. In this kind of problem, the
set of predictors acted upon by agents – called
the set of preferred predictors – determines the
attendance. But the attendance history also
determines the set of preferred predictors. We
can think of this set as forming a kind of
ecology (John Holland’s term). Of interest is
how this ecology evolves over time.
The simulations show that weekly attendance
fluctuates unpredictably, but mean attendance
always converges to sixty in the long run. The
predictors self-organize into an equilibrium
pattern or ecology in which (on average) 40%
of the preferred predictors forecast above sixty
and 60% below sixty. This 40/60 split remains
although the population of preferred predictors
keeps changing in membership forever. The
emergent ecology is rather like a forest whose
contours do not change, but whose individual
trees do. Similar results appeared throughout
Arthur’s experiments, robust to changes in the
types of hypotheses (read identities or moods).
There is another intriguing result. Although,
the computer-generated attendance results look
more like the outcome of a random process
rather than a deterministic one (see Figure 1),
there is no inherently random factor governing
how many people attend. Weekly attendance
is a deterministic function of the individual

predictions, themselves being deterministic
functions of the past attendance figures.

4. SCALES OF AWARENESS PROBLEM
4.1 K&S Argument Number 3
The third challenge raised by K&S is the fact
that it is difficult to consider all scales of
human awareness simultaneously, instead of
one circle of influence when devising a set of
mental models to simulate human behaviour in
a specific context. Although true, it evokes an
earlier statement: people engaged in simulation
are not expecting to represent what people may
think, feel and do in every context. Instead
they aim to explore the co-evolutionary space
under “as if” scenarios – collective results that
may emerge under particular conditions only.
Such conditions are described in terms of the
state of the agents, the environment in which
they interact and the sets of rules that govern
both agents and environment. Since the agents
are interacting in or on this environment, the
rules and state of the environment play a key
part in focusing each agent’s mind on the
decision at hand and the choice of a pragmatic
predictor or heuristic to apply to it.
Part of the art of agent-based simulation lies in
identifying settings where the agents’ decision
criteria are focused and limited in number (e.g.
fast and frugal), less emotive or theoretical.
Heuristics allow agents to make smart choices
quickly in the face of limited information, by
exploiting the way that information is
structured in some environments [Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2001]. In many settings, there is
little scope for sophisticated decision tools or
emotive states because the decision itself is of
a simple, binary kind – “GO or DON’T GO”.
In these situations, recollections of earlier
experiences of a similar kind tend to combine
with our current predisposition towards the
event, leading to a final decision.
4.2 The Bar Problem Interpreted
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The bar problem is a situation where a system
of interacting agents can develop collective
properties that are not at all obvious from our
knowledge of the agents themselves. Even if
we knew all agents’ individual idiosyncrasies,
we are no closer to anticipating the emergent
regularities. In the absence of communication
between the agents, individually subjective,
boundedly rational expectations self-organize
(under the influence of a strong aggregate
attractor) to produce “collectively rational”
behaviour [Arthur, 1994]. If we allow the
agents to learn and communicate using an
evolutionary process (a genetic programming
algorithm), heterogeneity among the agents
emerges in the form of role-playing and nonuniform social structures [Edmonds, 1999]. All
these collective properties are features that
emerge purely from the micro-dynamics.

best so far. The remainder of this paper will be
devoted to a discussion of other self-referential
systems and some examples of their nonlinear,
dynamic properties.

Is the bar problem important? From several
perspectives, it would seem to be. First, like
the Prisoners’ Dilemma, it is receiving more
attention outside economics – as a metaphor
for learning and bounded rationality. It has
inspired a new literature in statistical physics
on a closely related problem known as the
Minority Game. In this game, each agent
chooses one out of two alternatives every turn
and those who end up in the minority are the
winners. Like in the bar problem, numerical
simulations of this game have displayed a
remarkably rich set of emergent, collective
behaviours [Challet and Zhang, 1998].

5.1

Second, the bar problem contains all the key
elements of a complex adaptive system. It
involves a medium number of agents, a number
too large for hand-calculation or intuition but
too small to use statistical methods applicable
to very large populations. These agents are
intelligent and adaptive, making decisions on
the basis of rules of thumb or heuristics (like
the bar predictors). Needing to modify these
rules or come up with new ones if necessary,
they reason inductively. Importantly, no single
agent knows what all the others are (thinking
of) doing, because each has access to limited
information only.
Third, the bar problem is self-referential – a
situation where forecasts made by individual
agents act to create the world they are trying to
forecast. Such systems have also been called
reflexive or co-evolutionary [Batten, 2000]. In
self-referential systems, the “best” thing to do
(e.g. GO or DON’T GO) depends on what
everyone else is doing. Since no single agent
knows that, the best thing that they can do is to
apply the predictor or heuristic that has worked

5.

SELF-REFERENTIAL SYSTEMS

What do these self-referential situations have
in common? First, they are “GO or DON’T
GO” decision problems at specific locations in
space and time. Second, the best thing to do
depends on what everyone else is doing at that
time. Third, since no agent knows what all the
others are doing, agents must decide using a
predictor or heuristic that has worked well for
them earlier. Finally, there is a risk that agents
may be caught up in an undesirable collective
outcome – such as congestion.
Socio-Technical Systems

Many examples of self-referential problems lie
in the socio-technical arena. Socio-technical
systems are ones in which human beings
interact with each other in a physical
environment built by humans. Situations of a
qualitatively similar kind to the bar problem
arise, such as canteen crowding, queue lengths
at cinemas, crowds at sporting stadiums, and
traffic congestion during peak periods on our
roads and at our airports.
Like agent numbers turning up at the bar each
Thursday night, the number of vehicles turning
up on a specific road each day is unpredictable.
If the traffic density is pushed beyond critical
levels, however, it triggers unexpected phase
changes in the traffic’s collective behaviour.
Simulation work using Cellular Automata has
shown that the average speed drops rapidly
once the density passes a critical value –
corresponding to a jamming transition from
free-flow to start-stop waves. Fluctuations in
travel time from vehicle-to-vehicle go up very
quickly, reaching a peak near the point of
critical density. This emergent behaviour is
quite striking.
Of interest are the adaptive strategies of drivers
exposed to regular traffic jams. Downs [1962]
identified two behavioural classes of driver:
those with a low propensity to change their
mode or route strategy, called sheep, and those
with a propensity to change, called explorers.
Explorers search for alternative options to save
time. They are quick to learn and hold several
heuristics in mind simultaneously. Sheep are
more conservative and prone to following the
same option. Empirical work in North America
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has confirmed the presence of sheep and
explorer behaviour in real traffic [Conquest et
al, 1993]. Sheepish drivers, who are unwilling
to modify their commuting behaviour, made up
about one-quarter of the sample.
5.2

also evidence that sheep and explorers co-exist
in populations of trading agents. Such systems
have been called adaptive nonlinear networks
[Holland, 1988]. There are many such systems
in nature and society, such as nervous systems,
immune systems, ecologies and economies.

Socio-Economic Systems
5.3

Socio-economic systems are ones in which
human beings interact with one another in an
economic environment designed by humans.
Examples are stock and commodity exchanges,
labour markets and trade networks. Adopting
the “Santa Fe” complexity approach highlights
their self-referential character. Because agents
derive their expectations from an imagined
future that is an aggregate result of other
agents’ expectations, there is a self-referencing
of expectations that leads to deductive
indeterminacy. As with the above-mentioned
traffic example, agents’ forecasts combine to
create the very same world that they are trying
to forecast.
Collections of beliefs and heuristics co-evolve
in simulation experiments, revealing emergent
features of socio-economic systems. Markets
tend to mimic traffic systems. The beliefs and
expectations of drivers are constantly being
tested in a world that forms from their and
others’ beliefs and actions [Batten, 1998]. A
confused investor is akin to a confused driver!
Prediction for each means a beat-the-crowd
anticipation of tomorrow’s situation (stock
prices or travel times). How individual agents
decide what to do matters little. What happens
depends more on the interaction structure
through which they act, that is, who interacts
with whom according to which rules.
In real and simulated stock markets, agents’
expectations continually react and adapt to a
market they create together. Observable states
are often poised between the deterministic and
the seemingly chaotic (i.e. between simple and
complex). Given sufficient homogeneity of
beliefs, for example, the standard equilibrium
of the literature is upheld. As we turn the dial
of heterogeneity of beliefs up, the market
undergoes a phase transition and “comes to
life” developing a rich psychology. It displays
phenomena regarded as anomalies in the
standard theory but observed in real markets –
speculative bubbles, crashes, technical trading
and persistent volatility [Arthur, Durlauf and
Lane, 1997].
If we label these two regimes simple and
complex, there is growing evidence that real
markets live in the complex regime. There is

Socio-Ecological Systems

Socio-ecological systems are ones in which
human beings interact with one another and
other living systems in a natural environment.
Self-referential problems of the “GO/DON’T
GO” type arise in these systems, but are rarely
recognized as such. Most are commons
dilemmas in which agents are over-exploiting
natural resources. Examples are degradation
of national parks, overfishing of fisheries and
destruction of coral reefs.
In fisheries, for example, the “best” thing to do
in a fishing vessel definitely depends on what
everyone else is doing. Allen and McGlade
[1986] explored the implications of different
fishing strategies and information flows among
vessels. They found that such vessels exhibit
one of two strategies – Cartesian or Stochast.
Like sheepish drivers on our roads, Cartesians
are risk-averse agents who choose well-known
sites with the best possible return. Risk-taking
Stochasts direct their search more randomly.
Using agent-based models, information flow
among fishing vessels can be shown to have
important effects on the dynamics and resource
exploitation of a simulated fishery [Little et al,
2004]. Some vessels interact by obtaining
information about where other vessels are
fishing. Whether they share reliable catch
information is unclear, but agent-based models
can help to clarify the collective value of
information-sharing. Also, they can be used to
explore self-administered solutions that do not
involve the market or the state.
Since commons problems are management or
coordination problems, agent-based models
can provide decision support on sustainable
management strategies for them. For a review
of such models, see Hare and Deadman [2003].
Representing all the essential components of
socio-ecological systems is a vastly more
challenging task than doing the same for sociotechnical or socio-economic systems. In the
latter, the slower dynamics (of a road network
or an exchange system) can be ignored and the
physical or economic environment treated as a
constant. In many socio-ecological systems,
however, the dynamics cannot be simplified in
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such a way. Slower and faster processes must
be addressed together.

6.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have discussed some selfreferential systems, a class of social systems to
which objections raised by Kurtz and Snowden
[2003] may not always apply. Part of the
explanation for this lies in the emergent
complexity of these systems. At least some of
their emergent regularities are less sensitive to
individual behaviours and more to ways in
which agents interact and react in totality.
The fundamental class of properties of the
social world that agent-based simulation is
opening to new understanding is that which
occurs only in the dynamics produced by the
interactions of the agents making up the
system. Emergent novelty derives mostly from
accumulated interactions between agents and
the co-evolutionary learning that it engenders.
This reflexive process may induce the traits of
agents to change over time. If the collective
outcomes of these self-referential systems turn
out to be insensitive to the rich spectrum of
idiosyncrasies that human beings possess
individually, then it is quite reasonable to
disregard these idiosyncrasies as inputs to the
simulations because they are not central to the
context under investigation.
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